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NATO AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
IN THE KOSOVO CAMPAIGN – CAN 
BILL CLINTON AND TONY BLAIR BE 
HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE? 
Peter James Niven* 
This paper examines the international law doctrines of command responsibility and sovereign 
immunity with respect to the potential liability of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair for any war crimes 
committed during “Operation Just Cause” in Kosovo in 1999. The paper discusses some of the 
alleged crimes committed by NATO forces during the operation to establish a context for the 
analysis of their potential liability under the doctrine of command responsibility. This doctrine 
makes commanders criminally liable if they knew, or should have known, of crimes committed or 
about to be committed by their subordinates and the commander fails to take necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent the crimes or punish the perpetrators. Even if Clinton and Blair 
could be held criminally liable under this doctrine any prosecution faces the hurdle of sovereign 
immunity attaching to them as a former Head of State and current Head of Government. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The formation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)1 has led to the first international judicial 
  
*  This paper was originally submitted in September 2001 for the LLB (Hons) Degree at Victoria University of 
Wellington, and the section on sovereign immunity has been updated to reflect the International Court of 
Justice decision in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v Belgium) (14 February 2002) ICJ <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/ 
icobejudgment/icobe-ijudgment_20020214.pdf> (last accessed 20 September 2002). 
1  The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia <http://www.un.org/icty/index.html> (last 
accessed 20 July 2001) [ICTY]; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda <http://www.ictr.org/> (last 
accessed 10 June 2001) [ICTR]. The ICTY was created pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 827 of 
25 May 1993 <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S-RES-827_93.htm> (last accessed 12 August 2001); the 
ICTR was created by the Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994 
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/Resolutions/955e.htm> (last accessed 12 August 2001). Both tribunals 
were established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations [UN Charter] 
<http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch-cont.htm> (last accessed 12 August 2001). 
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proceedings against perpetrators of serious international crimes since the end of the Second World 
War. Since their formation, there has been further progress at the international level aimed at ending 
impunity for international criminals. The most important of these is the formation of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which came into being on 1 July 2002.2 It currently has 139 
signatories and has been ratified by 80 States.3 New Zealand has ratified the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court and has passed implementing legislation.4 A special court is in the 
process of formation in Sierra Leone to deal with the war crimes from that conflict, developed 
through cooperation between Sierra Leone and the United Nations.5 Talks have resumed between 
Cambodia and the United Nations aimed at establishing a tribunal to try those guilty of serious 
crimes during Cambodia's civil war.6 The failure of Indonesia to adequately prosecute those 
responsible for the crimes in East Timor in 1999 is also leading to calls for the formation of a 
tribunal for the world's newest nation.7 
This renewed international effort to bring the perpetrators of serious international crimes to 
justice is the concern of all States. The ICTY and ICTR were established under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter, so all member States are under an international obligation to cooperate with 
them.8 States-parties to the ICC will be under international obligations, defined in the ICC Statute, 
to cooperate with that court once it is established. Under some international treaties and 
conventions, including the ICC Statute, States-parties are required to establish domestic jurisdiction 
  
2  Under art 126 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (1998) 37 ILM 998 
[ICC Statute]. 
3  See <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp> (last 
accessed 18 September 2002). 
4  The International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000. 
5  UN News Service Press Release SG/A/813 AFR/444 "Appointments to Sierra Leone Special Court" (26 
July 2002) <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sga813.doc.htm> (last accessed 18 September 2002); 
Sierra Leone's implementing legislation for the special court, the implementing agreement and statute of the 
court are all available on the "No Peace Without Justice" Website 
<http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/index1.htm> (last accessed 18 September 2002). 
6  BBC News Online "Cambodia to Resume UN Tribunal Talks" (22 August 2002) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2209063.stm> (last accessed 18 September 2002). 
7  BBC News Online "East Timor Verdicts Provoke Outrage" (15 Aug 2002) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2195196.stm> (last accessed 03 September 2002). 
8  The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions establishing the ICTY were made under Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter, <http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch-cont.htm>, which empowers the 
UNSC to make resolutions that are binding on all member states of the UN.  
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over offenders.9 These developments are positive steps towards ending impunity for serious 
international criminals. 
The conflict in Afghanistan, the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the war with 
Iraq, the recent violence and allegations of war crimes in Israel, all highlight starkly the need to 
ensure there is no impunity for offenders against international humanitarian law. The prevention and 
suppression of war crimes in particular is contingent on commanders and civilian leaders ensuring 
that legal standards are adhered to, and enforced when they are not adhered to. International law 
recognises this need through the imposition of a duty on commanders to prevent or to punish 
international crimes in their subordinates. This paper will examine this doctrine of command 
responsibility in the context of the NATO Campaign in Kosovo in 1999, Operation Allied Force. 
There have been allegations that civilian leaders of NATO are criminally responsible for the 
commission of serious international crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes in Kosovo. The international developments in this area make it an interesting exercise to 
consider whether Tony Blair and Bill Clinton could be held criminally liable under international law 
for any international crimes that may have been committed by NATO during Operation Allied 
Force.  
The issues of international law that this scenario raises revolve principally around two 
international law doctrines: the doctrine of command responsibility and the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. This is due to the fact that, with the possible exception of the crime of aggression, neither 
Clinton nor Blair could have been the actual perpetrator of any offence. Neither leader actually 
dropped any bombs or launched any missiles that caused civilian deaths. Any criminal liability that 
the two may be exposed to will be via the doctrine of command responsibility, for either directly 
ordering or planning acts that were international crimes, or through an omission-based liability for 
failing to prevent or punish any crimes committed by subordinates under their effective control. 
Even if criminal liability is established via command responsibility both men enjoy a degree of 
immunity by virtue of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and Part VI will seek to establish how 
this doctrine interrelates to the notion of individual criminal responsibility at international law. 
This paper will first examine the allegations made against NATO to determine whether there a 
prima facie case can be made out. It will then determine the content of the doctrine of command 
responsibility at customary international law, and how it pertains to civilian leaders. The doctrine 
can then be applied to Clinton and Blair, with respect to some of the alleged criminal incidents from 
the Kosovo campaign. Finally the impact of the doctrine of sovereign immunity on their potential 
criminal liability under the doctrine of command responsibility will be considered. 
  
9  For example, see: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (10 December 1984) 1465 UNTS 85 Art 5 [Torture Convention 1984]; Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide  (9 December 1948) 78 UNTS 277, Art 5 [Genocide 
Convention 1948].   
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This paper will not examine the issue of whether NATO, and the NATO leaders who made the 
decision to use force, may have committed the crime of aggression. It is worth noting that the 
content and scope of the crime of aggression is the subject of some controversy in the international 
community,10 and that politicians and international lawyers alike dispute the legality of NATO's 
intervention in Kosovo.11 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has brought cases before the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the participating NATO countries.12 If the ICJ makes a 
decision on the merits of these cases that may provide some needed clarification of where 
international law stands on the use of force for humanitarian intervention. 
II INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND NATO: GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY? 
A The Charges Against NATO  
This section examines the allegations that have been made against NATO, and whether there is a 
prima facie case to answer on these allegations. There have been a number of allegations ranging 
from an accusation of genocide through to allegations of war crimes relating to individual incidents. 
the claims of genocide and crimes against humanity are not sustainable, as the legal threshold 
requirements are not met, and it is only for some of the more problematic incidents that a prima 
facie case can be made out for a war crime having been committed.  It is on the basis of these 
incidents that we can assess Clinton and Blair's possible criminal liability. 
  
10  The signatories of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court were unable to agree on the 
definition of the crime of aggression and its inclusion in the Statute, with the result that it was excluded until 
a review of the Statute seven years after entry into force: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(17 July 1998) 37 ILM 998, arts 5(2), 121 and 123. 
11  For example, Sergey Egorov, Professor of International Law at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Moscow, rejects any right of humanitarian intervention without authorisation by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter: Sergey Alexeyevich Egorov "The Kosovo Crisis and the 
Law of Armed Conflicts" (31 March 2000) International Review of the Red Cross No 837, 183 
<http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/4dc394db5b54f3fa4125673900241f2f/002b6188e758f33b412568d40028cf
8d?OpenDocument> (last accessed 20 July 2001); Law and Right: When They Don't Fit Together 
Economist (3 April 1999) 19 – 20. 
12  Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v Belgium) (Yugoslavia v Canada) (Yugoslavia v France) (Yugoslavia 
v Germany) (Yugoslavia v Italy) (Yugoslavia v Netherlands) (Yugoslavia v Portugal) (Yugoslavia v United 
Kingdom). Any substantive judgment on the merits of the case is a long way off, with the ICJ recently 
extending by another year the time-limits originally fixed for the filing by Yugoslavia of written statements 
of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections raised by the eight respondent States to 7 
April 2003: ICJ Press Release 2002/10 22 March 2002 <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ 
ipress2002/ipresscom2002-10_yugo_20020322.htm> (last accessed 18 September 2002).  
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There have been allegations from a variety of sources that NATO committed a number of war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity during the Kosovo war.13 Amnesty International 
produced a report,14 based on the work done by Human Rights Watch15 and allegations by the FRY 
authorities, which alleged war crimes relating to a number of specific attacks on civilians. The 
Office of the Tribunal Prosecutor (OTP) for the ICTY investigated these claims and produced a 
report that concluded there was insufficient evidence to proceed with any prosecutions for war 
crimes.16 The OTP Final Report only considered allegations of war crimes against NATO. The 
wider allegations advanced against NATO, including allegations of genocide and crimes against 
humanity, were not considered. However, neither of these allegations can be sustained, as the 
threshold requirements for these offences are not met. 
B Genocide 
Genocide involves specified acts "committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group".17 There is no evidence to suggest that NATO had any 
such intent, in fact the evidence is that they acted to prevent what they believed to be widespread 
persecution and murder by the forces of FRY of Kosovar Albanians based on their racial and 
religious identity.18 There is sufficient evidence that FRY was engaged in such acts that Milosevic 
  
13  For example, Tania Voon "Pointing the Finger: Civilian Casualties of NATO Bombing in the Kosovo 
Conflict (2001) 16 Am U Int'l Rev 1083; see also the "indictment" drawn up by the former US Attorney 
General Ramsey Clark, naming both Clinton and Blair along with numerous others, charging them with 
various crimes on behalf of the International Action Centre (IAC) <http://www.iacenter.org/ 
warcrime/indictmt.htm> (last accessed 21 August 2001).  
14  NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: "'Collateral Damage' or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws 
of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force" (EUR 70/018/2000) [Amnesty Report] 
<http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/EUR700182000> (last accessed on 1 July 2001). 
15  Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, February 2000 <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/ 
index.htm> (last accessed on 1 July 2001). 
16  Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para 90 [OTP Final Report] <http://www.un.org/ 
icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm> (last accessed on 1 July 2001). 
17  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) 78 UNTS 277, 
Art 2. 
18  NATO Secretary General, Dr Javier Solana at NATO Press Conference 25 March 1999 (after the first night 
of combat operations): "Let me reiterate we are determined to continue until we have achieved our 
objectives: to halt the violence and to stop further humanitarian catastrophe. Let me emphasise once again 
that we have no quarrel with the people of Yugoslavia. Our actions are directed against the repressive 
policies of the Yugoslav government, which is refusing to respect civilized norms of behaviour in this 
Europe at the end of the 20th century." NATO Press Conference (25 March 1999) <http://www.nato.int/ 
kosovo/press/p990325a.htm> (last accessed 18 September 2002). 
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is currently on trial at the ICTY for alleged crimes including forced deportation, murder and 
persecution in Kosovo.19 
C Crimes Against Humanity 
The ICTY has conducted the first prosecutions for crimes against humanity by an international 
tribunal since the proceedings at the end of the Second World War. Crimes against humanity are 
included in the ICTY Statute at Article 5.20 The ICTY in the Tadic Case21 has interpreted Article 5 
of its Statute so that in order to constitute a crime against humanity, acts must occur within the 
context of an armed conflict; be linked geographically or temporally with that conflict; the act must 
not be unrelated to the conflict, such as for personal motives; and the act must occur as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population.22 The Trial Chamber was of the opinion 
that the requirement for an armed conflict in the ICTY Statute narrowed the customary international 
law position,23 as consideration of other international instruments and jurisprudence illustrates that 
in customary law there is no requirement for "an armed conflict."  
In the ICC Statute, crimes against humanity must be committed in the context of a "wide-spread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack",24 
though the attack does not have to be military in nature, and therefore presumably there is no need 
for an armed conflict as a contextual requirement.25 The ICTR Statute does not have a requirement 
  
19  The Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic, Vlajko 
Stojiljkovic IT-99-37-PT, Second Amended Indictment (16 October 2001) <http://www.un.org/ 
icty/indictment/english/mil-2ai011029e.htm> (last accessed 16 September 2002). 
20  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as amended 30 November 2000 
by Resolution 1329 [ICTY Statute] <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000_con.htm> (last accessed 
16 August 2001).  
21  Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic aka "Dule" Trial Chamber Judgment IT-94-1 (ICTY, 7 May 1997) [Tadic] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 8 July 2001). This judgment was 
the first by the ICTY, and the "the first determination of individual guilt or innocence in connection with 
serious violations of international humanitarian law by an international tribunal .... The international 
military tribunals at Nürnberg and Tokyo ... were multinational in nature, representing only part of the 
world community" Tadic, above, para 1. Consequently, it was the first judicial determination of the legal 
tests for crimes against humanity and the development of international law since the trials following the 
Second World War. 
22  Tadic, above, paras 618–659. 
23  Tadic, above, para 627. 
24  Under art 126 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (1998) 37 ILM 998, 
Art 7. 
25  Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum Part II, Finalized 
draft text of the Elements of Crimes (2 November 2000) PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, 9 [ICC Draft Elements of 
Crimes] <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/elements/english/1_add2e.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks> (last 
accessed 15 August 2001).  
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in its Article 3 for the existence of an armed conflict.26 The International Law Commission's 
(ILC)27 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (ILC Draft Code) outlines 
the contextual requirements for crimes against humanity in Article 18, as "committed in a systematic 
manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any organisation or 
group."28 The ILC in its commentary rejects the requirement for a connection to an armed conflict 
or war crimes for the proscribed acts to constitute crimes against humanity.29 Having regard to the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY,30 the ICTR and the various international instruments discussed above, 
the contextual requirements for crimes against humanity are that the act was part of a widespread 
and systematic attack on a civilian population, and that the perpetrator knew that the act was part of 
that attack. 
The evidence of the nature and intent of NATO operations does not support any claim that they 
constituted a systematic or widespread attack on a civilian population. As the OTP Final Report 
notes, out of some 10,484 strike sorties by NATO aircraft, releasing 23,614 air munitions, only 
around 90 incidents have been documented that involved civilian deaths (0.9% of all strikes 
missions).31 The first alternative requirement, a systematic attack, means attacks "pursuant to a 
preconceived plan or policy".32 The contextual requirement of an "attack on a civilian population" is 
understood as attacks as part of a State or organisational policy of attack on that civilian 
  
26  "The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the 
following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds …" Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, Art 3 [ICTR Statute] <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html> (last 
accessed 10 August 2001). 
27  The International Law Commission was established by the General Assembly in 1947 to promote the 
progressive development of international law and its codification (Article 13(1) of the Charter of the United 
Nations) <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/introfra.htm> (last accessed 9 August 2001). 
28  Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996 Art 18 [ILC Draft Code] 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm> (last accessed 1 April 2001). The Draft Code was 
provisionally adopted in 1988: Regina v Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and 
Others, Ex Parte Pinochet; Regina v Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 
and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet [1999] UKHL 17 Lord Goff, paras 83 - 84 [Pinochet]. 
29  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session (6 May-26 July 1996) 
General Assembly Official Records - Fifty-first Session Supplement No 10 (A/51/10), Chapter II, 
commentary on Art 18, para 6 [ILC Report 1996] <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/96repfra.htm> 
(last accessed 15 August 2001). 
30  This acknowledges that its requirement for an "armed conflict", dictated by the wording of its Statute, 
narrows the customary international law position, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic aka "Dule" Trial Chamber 
Judgment IT-94-1 (ICTY, 7 May 1997). 
31  Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para 54. 
32  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, above, para 3. 
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population.33 While a few individual cases might involve allegations of targeting of civilians, there 
is no evidence that NATO had a policy or plan to target civilians.34 In fact all the evidence, 
including the statistics quoted above, tend to establish that NATO policy and planning was 
predicated on avoiding civilian casualties as far as was possible. The individual incidents alleged by 
the FRY to constitute crimes against humanity do not occur in the necessary context, and therefore 
do not meet the threshold requirement. 
D War Crimes 
The last category that the incidents may fall under is that of war crimes, violations by NATO of 
the laws and customs of war. These are codified to a certain extent in international treaties and 
instruments such as the Geneva Conventions, and their protocols, and the Hague Conventions.35 
The laws and customs of war also form part of international customary law. In the context of 
NATO's attack on the FRY, the threshold requirement of an international conflict is met for the full 
application of all of the laws and customs of war. 
There have been a number of allegations of war crimes made against NATO, many allegations 
relating to specific identified incidents. The presence of members of the international press in 
Kosovo and Serbia, and the technology of NATO aircraft meant that the details of specific incidents 
were often available within days, sometimes hours, of the attacks. As discussed above the OTP final 
report found insufficient evidence of any war crimes to justify proceeding with further 
investigation.36  
The OTP final report considers general accusations in relation to over 24 incidents, and then 
considers five particular incidents that "were the most problematic".37 This paper will consider the 
possible liability for Clinton and Blair via the doctrine of command responsibility for three of these 
"problematic" incidents. 
  
33  Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum Part II, Finalized 
draft text of the Elements of Crimes (2 November 2000) PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, 9. 
34  Some of these problematic individual cases will be discussed below in connection with the allegations of 
war crimes.  
35  The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are included as schedules to the Geneva Conventions Act 1958 and 
their two Additional Protocols are included as schedules to the Geneva Conventions Amendment Act 1987. 
Both the Geneva Conventions, their Protocols and the Hague Conventions and annexed regulations are 
available on-line at the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ 
instree/auoy.htm> (last accessed 19 September 2002). 
36  Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [OTP Final Report], para 90. 
37  OTP Final Report, above, para 57. 
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As the focus of this paper is on the liability of Clinton and Blair via the doctrine of command 
responsibility, this paper will not examine the lawfulness of the various incidents alleged to be 
violations of the laws and customs of war. Instead three specific incidents will be assumed to be 
prima facie war crimes for the purposes of the discussion of command responsibility and sovereign 
immunity:38 
(1) The attack on a civilian passenger train at the Grdelica Gorge on 12 April 1999.39 A 
NATO aircraft fired two missiles at a bridge, hitting a train and killing as many as 12 
civilians. The second missile was fired after the train had been hit and identified by the 
pilot, aimed at a different part of the smoke-obscured bridge. The train had slid forward 
and was hit again. This will be assumed to be a grave breach of the First Protocol, Article 
85(3)(b),40 characterised as an "indiscriminate" attack.41 
(2) The second incident is the attack on the convoys at Djakovica on 14 April 1999.42 NATO 
aircraft bombed two separate columns of refugees after they misidentified them as 
military convoys. As many as 70 civilians may have been killed and over 100 wounded. 
  
38  Despite the OTP findings that there was insufficient evidence to warrant further investigation over these 
incidents there is still opinion that these incidents did in fact constitute breaches of the laws of war. For 
example, Tania Voon "Pointing the Finger: Civilian Casualties of NATO Bombing in the Kosovo Conflict 
(2001) 16 Am U Int'l Rev 1083; A "tribunal" convened by the IAC, found NATO "guilty" of a number of 
war crimes at a mock trial held in New York on 10 June 2000, IAC "War Crimes Tribunal Finds US and 
NATO Guilty" (6 December 2000) <http://www.iacenter.org/warcrime/wct2000.htm> (last accessed 21 
August 2001). 
39  OTP Final Report, above, paras 58-62; NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: "'Collateral Damage' or 
Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force" (EUR 
70/018/2000) [Amnesty Report] <http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/EUR700182000>  (last accessed on 1 
July 2001) s 5.1. 
40  Article 8 s (3) The following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches, when committed wilfully, in violation 
of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death…(b) launching an indiscriminate attack 
affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive 
loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects…" Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) (June 8 1977) 1125 UNTS 3 Art 85 [First Protocol]. 
41  First Protocol, above, Art 51(4)-51(5) defines an "indiscriminate" attack. Arguably these attacks, in failing 
to comply with the precautionary measures mandated under Art 57, may have shaded into indiscriminate 
attacks either in terms of Art 51(4)(a) or 51(4)(c). 
42  Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, paras 63-70 [OTP Final Report]; NATO/Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia: "'Collateral Damage' or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during 
Operation Allied Force" (EUR 70/018/2000) [Amnesty Report] <http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/ 
EUR700182000> (last accessed on 1 July 2001) s 5.2. 
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This will be assumed to be a grave breach of the First Protocol, Article 85(3)(b), 
characterised as an "indiscriminate" attack.43 
(3) The last incident is the attack on Serbian State Television and Radio (RTS) on 23 April 
1999.44 At least 16 civilians were killed and another 16 wounded in this attack. This could 
be a violation of either the First Protocol, Article 85(3)(a),45 making the civilian 
population the object of attack, if RTS was not a military objective;46 or the First 
Protocol, Article 85(3)(b), if the attack was characterised as an "indiscriminate" attack. 
III THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 
Assuming that the three incidents outlined above are prima facie war crimes, can criminal 
liability be attributed to Clinton and Blair? In each instance the actual attack was conducted by 
unidentified coalition aircraft, operating under orders from their immediate commanders, orders 
passed through the chain of command from NATO command. As a former Head of State and a 
current Head of Government respectively, the question is whether they can be held criminally liable 
through the doctrine of command responsibility for these incidents. 
The first formal recognition of a duty for military commanders to prevent and punish violations 
of the laws of war by their subordinates is arguably in the 1907 Hague Conventions.47 The idea that 
military commanders, and even civilian leaders, might be held criminally liable for violations of the 
laws and customs of war by their subordinates was canvassed as early as the close of World War 
One:48  
  
43  OTP Final Report, above. 
44  OTP Final Report, above, paras 71 - 79; Amnesty Report, above, s 5.3. 
45  Article 85 (3) "the following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches, when committed wilfully, in violation 
of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death…(a) making the civilian population or 
individual civilians the object of attack", First Protocol, above, Art 85. 
46  Military Objects are defined in the First Protocol, "(3) The following acts shall be regarded as grave 
breaches, when committed wilfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing 
death…(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the 
knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects…" First Protocol, above, Art 52(30). 
47  "Undoubtedly … the Hague Conventions IV (1907) 5 and X (1907) 6 created affirmative command duties 
in relation to the conduct of subordinate persons, establishing the doctrine of 'command responsibility'": 
Ilias Bantekas "The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility" 93 AJIL 573, 573; Andrew D Mitchell 
"Failure to Halt, Prevent or Punish: The Doctrine of Command Responsibility for War Crimes" 22 Sydney 
L Rev 381, 383 – 384. 
48  Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties, Report 
Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (1920) 14 AJIL 95, 121 [Commission on Responsibility 
Report]. 
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There remain, however, a number of charges … against all authorities, civil or military, belonging to 
enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, including the 
heads of states, who ordered, or with knowledge thereof and with power to intervene, abstained from 
preventing or taking measures to prevent, putting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws or 
customs of war …  
The recommended "high tribunal" for the trial of these and other charges did not eventuate.49 It 
was not until the trials of war criminals following the Second World War that this doctrine of 
command responsibility was applied. The Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal did not fully incorporate 
the doctrine of command responsibility,50 and proceeded only on the basis of direct liability for the 
highest Nazi officials.  It was the Tokyo Tribunal, in the Yamashita case,51 that first convicted a 
superior for his responsibility in failing to prevent or punish crimes of his subordinates. Subsequent 
proceedings in Europe against German commanders and officials also proceeded on the basis of this 
indirect liability.52 Following the trials in Nürnberg and Tokyo, it was not immediately clear to 
contemporaries what the full scope of the doctrine was in terms of responsibility for failure by 
superiors to prevent or punish war crimes.53 The introduction into the 1977 First Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions of duties on commanders were not only "… uncontested during the 
deliberations for the adoption of Geneva Protocol I, but both Articles 86 and 87 were held to be in 
conformity with pre-existing law."54 
  
49  Commission on Responsibility Report, above, 122–123. 
50  Art 6 of the Charter provides that "Leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are 
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan." Agreement for the Prosecution 
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal London, (8 August 1945) [Nürnberg Charter] <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ 
385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/59e5a3f396d98cc3c125641e00405ea7?OpenDocument> (last 
accessed 9 August 2001). This incorporates the first limb of command responsibility as discussed below, 
liability for positive acts, but makes no mention of liability for omission to prevent or punish, or indirect 
liability.  
51  United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1 (1948).  Following 
conviction Yamashita appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the doctrine of command 
responsibility is addressed in that judgment: J v K Yamashita (1946) 327 US 1. 
52  Ilias Bantekas "The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility" 93 AJIL 573, 574; Greg R Vetter 
"Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court" (2000) 25 Yale J 
Int'l L 89, 95. 
53  "No clear rule has emerged as to the extent to which a civil or military superior can be convicted of failing 
to prevent crimes committed by persons under his authority", G Brand "War Crimes Trials and the Laws of 
War" (1949) 26 BYIL 414, 424. 
54  Bantekas, above, 576–577. 
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The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1992 was the 
first opportunity since the post-World War Two trials for an international tribunal to examine the 
doctrine of command responsibility. International law had developed since the Nürnberg and Tokyo 
trials, with the entry into force of the various Geneva Conventions and Protocols, and the 
development of international humanitarian law. The doctrine of command responsibility, as regards 
indirect responsibility,55 is articulated at Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute:56 
[t]he fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a 
subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that 
the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
In interpreting Article 7(3) the ICTY had to have regard to the international customary law 
existing at the time of the offences, to avoid compromising the nullum crimen sine lege principle.57 
The Tribunal considers its interpretation of Article 7(3) to be consistent with the position in 
customary international law at the time the offences were committed,58 having regard to the World 
War Two jurisprudence from the Nürnberg and Tokyo trials,59 the relevant articles from the First 
  
55  Direct liability is captured under Article 7(1): "A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or 
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 
of the present statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime". Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as amended 30 November 2000 by Resolution 1329 [ICTY Statute] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000_con.htm> (last accessed 16 August 2001). 
56  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as amended 30 November 2000 
by Resolution 1329 [ICTY Statute] <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000_con.htm> (last accessed 
16 August 2001). Article 7(3); note the ICTR has an identical provision, Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art 3 [ICTR Statute] <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/ 
statute.html> (last accessed 10 August 2001) Art 6(3). 
57  "The implication of these explanations is that the Security Council, not being a legislative body, cannot 
create offences. It therefore vests in the Tribunal the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of offences already 
recognised in international humanitarian law. The Statute does not create substantive law, but provides a 
forum and framework for the enforcement of existing international humanitarian law" Prosecutor v Zejnil 
Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") ("Celebici" Case) 
Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 16 November 1998) para 417 [Celebici Case Trial Judgment] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001); this principle is 
enshrined in the ICC Statute, above, Art 22. 
58  The ICTY has jurisdiction over offences committed within the territories of the Former Yugoslavia from 1 
January 1991, ICTY Statute, above, Art 1. The ICTY's consideration of international law is grounded in this 
time period, and subsequent developments, such as the emergence of the ICC, may effect changes on the 
content of customary international law in the future. See below para 31. 
59  Some of the main cases are: Yamashita United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals 1 (1948) following conviction Yamashita appealed to the US Supreme Court, and the 
doctrine of command responsibility is addressed in that judgment: In re Yamashita (1946) 327 US 1; United 
States v Karl Brandt et al Vol IV Trials of War Criminals before the Nürnberg Military Tribunals under 
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Protocol,60 the ICC Statute61 and the ILC Draft Code.62 As a result its jurisprudence is of 
significance for other international tribunals or courts (the ICTR, and the ICC) and also for domestic 
courts dealing with offences under domestic jurisdiction.63 
The ICTY considered the doctrine of command responsibility in a number of cases, in particular 
in the Celebici Case Judgments by Trial Chamber II and the Appeals Chamber.64  In this case, four 
men were charged with various crimes committed in the Celebici prison camp, located in central 
Bosnia. Of the four Zdravko Mucic and Zejnil Delalic were charged with criminal liability as 
superiors for failing to prevent or punish the crimes of their subordinates, pursuant to Article 7(3) of 
the ICTY Statute. Delalic was acquitted on this count, but Mucic was found guilty. This case was 
  
Control Council Law No 10 (US Govt Printing Office: Washington 1950) (hereafter "TWC"); United States 
v Wilhelm List et al Vol XI TWC; United States v Wilhelm Von Leeb et al Vol XI TWC; United States v 
Soemu Toyoda Official Transcript of Record of Trial [Toyoda]; Trial of Friederich Flick et al Vol VI TWC 
[Flick]; Government Commissioner v Roechling 14 TWC [Roechling]. 
60  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (June 8 1977) 1125 UNTS 3 [First Protocol] Arts 86 
and 87. 
61  Under article 126 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (1998) 37 ILM 998 
[ICC Statute] Art 28. 
62  Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996 Art 18 [ILC Draft Code] 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm> (last accessed 1 April 2001) Art 6. 
63  The Prosecutor of the ICTY has allowed some cases within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to proceed in 
domestic courts, Sean D Murphy "Developments in International Criminal Law: Progress and Jurisprudence 
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (1999) 93 AJIL 57, 64 – 65. On a more general 
note, the development of jurisprudence in the area of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the 
International Tribunals will hopefully help domestic courts avoid the sort of mistaken jurisprudence 
exemplified by R v Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701. The Canadian Supreme Court read in to the actus reus and 
mens rea requirements for Canada's domestic war crimes legislation a number of extra elements not founded 
in international custom that will make prosecution in most cases virtually impossible: Irwin Cotter "Regina 
v Finta, Canadian Supreme Court War Crimes Decision" 90 AJIL 461. 
64  Celebici Case Trial Judgment, above, paras 330 - 400; Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka 
"Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") ("Celebici" Case) Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 20 
February 2001) paras 182-314 [Celebici Case Appeal Judgment] <http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/ 
judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001); Vetter is of the opinion that "… it is likely that the best 
evidence of customary international law for command responsibility is the Celebici case because of its 
thorough treatment of the doctrine", Greg R Vetter, "Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in 
the International Criminal Court" (2000) 25 Yale J Int'l L 89, 111. The Celebici formulation of the doctrine 
of command responsibility has not gone un-criticised. Ching is of the opinion that the Celebici formulation 
is not perfect as "… it has the potential danger of creating extensive liability for an especially poor or dull 
commander", Ann B Ching "COMMENT: Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in Light of 
the Celebici Decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" 25 NCJ Int'l Law & 
Com Reg 167, 204. On the other hand, Bantekas is of the opinion that the doctrine as elucidated in the 
Celebici case is too stringent in its requirements for prosecution, so that some offenders will potentially 
escape liability: Ilias Bantekas "The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility" 93 AJIL 142 - 143. 
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the first international judgment since World War Two holding a superior liable for the crimes of his 
subordinates.65 After the ICTY formulated the doctrine in the Celebici case it has gone on to apply it 
in a number of other cases.66 
Command responsibility has two aspects: responsibility for positive acts (for example, ordering, 
instigating, planning) and responsibility for culpable omissions, such as the failure to prevent or 
punish war crimes of subordinates.67 The latter omission-based (or "indirect") responsibility is 
based on the existence of a legal duty to act to prevent or punish crimes of subordinates.68 The trial 
court broke down the elements in command responsibility for failure to act as follows:69 
(1) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; 
(2) the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been 
committed; and 
(3) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal 
act or punish the perpetrator thereof. 
The superior-subordinate relationship can be either de facto or de jure, and individuals can be 
criminally liable under the command responsibility doctrine when in non-military positions of 
superior authority. The relationship must be characterised by the superior having:70 
  
65  Ching, above, 185. 
66  Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski Judgment IT-95-14/1 (ICTY, 25 June 1999) [Aleksovski] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/trialc/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001); The Prosecutor 
v Thomir Blaskic Judgment IT-95-14 (ICTY, 3 March 2000) [Blaskic] <http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/ 
trialc1/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 12 August 2001); Prosecutor v Radislav Kristic Judgment IT-
98-33 (ICTY, 2 August 2001) paras 647-651 [Kristic] <http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialC1/ 
judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 15 August 2001). In the last case as the court made a finding of 
criminal liability for Kristic under Article 7(1), direct command responsibility, it did not enter a conviction 
under Article 7(3) even though the tests were met for liability under that article, Kristic, above, para 651. 
67  Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") 
["Celebici" Case Judgment] IT-96-21 (ICTY, 16 November 1998) para 417 [Celebici Case Trial Judgment] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001) para 333 – 334. 
68  For example, First Protocol, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (June 8 1977) 1125 
UNTS 3 Article 85 [First Protocol], Art 86 and 87; Ilias Bantekas "The Contemporary Law of Superior 
Responsibility" 93 AJIL, 592 - 594.  
69  Celebici Case Trial Judgment, above, para 346. 
70  Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") (" 
Celebici" Case) Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 20 February 2001) paras 182-314 [Celebici Case Appeal 
Judgment] <http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001) para 
378. 
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… effective control over the persons committing the underlying violations of international humanitarian 
law, in the sense of having the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of these offences 
… such authority can have a de jure or a de facto character. 
This element was considered on appeal by the Appeals Chamber, which upheld the Trial 
Chamber's analysis of customary law, rejecting the prosecution's proposition that influence or 
powers of persuasion alone could found command responsibility.71 The Appeals Chamber held that 
the Trials Chamber had applied the correct test of "effective control".72 It was also noted that the de 
facto control element of the test allows for command responsibility to arise where the superior-
subordinate relationship is indirect in character, as opposed to a direct relationship in a military 
chain of command, and that the control itself could be of an indirect character.73 
The mens rea element that the superior "knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was 
about to be or had been committed" can be satisfied by either actual knowledge or by possession of 
information sufficient to put the superior on notice of the risk of such offences having occurred or 
occurring.74 The prosecutor must establish actual knowledge through direct or circumstantial 
evidence. There is no presumption of knowledge merely because offences may have been 
widespread, numerous, publicly notorious, or committed over wide areas or over prolonged 
periods.75 However these factors may allow an inference to arise that he must have possessed that 
knowledge.76  
  
71  Celebici Case Appeal Judgment, above, paras 248-268. For a criticism of this finding, see Ilias Bantekas 
"The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility" 93 AJIL 573, 574; Greg R Vetter "Command 
Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court" (2000) 25 Yale J Int'l L 89, 
95.581 – 582. 
72  Celebici Case Appeal Judgment, above, paras 266-267. 
73  Celebici Case Appeal Judgment, above, paras 251-252. 
74  Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") 
("Celebici" Case) Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 16 November 1998) para 417 [Celebici Case Trial Judgment] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001) para 383. 
75  Bantekas argues that post World War II jurisprudence does establish a rebuttable presumption of actual 
knowledge where crimes were widespread and notorious, and that the ICTY's refusal to accept this 
presumption was "despite the weight of that precedent". Ilias Bantekas "The Contemporary Law of Superior 
Responsibility" 93 AJIL 588 – 590. 
76  Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") 
("Celebici" Case) Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 16 November 1998) para 417 [Celebici Case Trial Judgment] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001) paras 228 - 230. 
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The second limb, "had reason to know" is consistent in meaning with the First Protocol Article 
86(2) reference to "… had information which should have enabled them to conclude …"77 A 
commander therefore needs to be in possession of some information sufficient to put him on notice 
that crimes had been, or were going to be, committed.78 The types of information that can put a 
commander "on notice" vary, including oral and written reports, knowledge of levels of training and 
the character of his men; and for the information to be "in his possession" it is sufficient that it was 
available or provided to the superior, even if he did not acquaint himself with it.79 The Appeals 
Chamber rejected the prosecution's assertion that customary international law established a "duty to 
know" for military and civilian superiors.80 Such a duty would have the effect of making criminal 
liability under the doctrine of command responsibility a form of strict liability. As such it is 
necessary to establish particular information a superior had "in his possession" which was sufficient 
to put him on notice. 
The third overall requirement is failure to take necessary and reasonable measures in accordance 
with their legal duty.81 A superior can only reasonably be expected to take such measures as are 
within their power to take, expressed by the trial court as "such measures that are within his material 
possibility". The ICTY Trial Chamber also notes that the "lack of formal legal competence to take 
the necessary measures to prevent or repress the crime in question does not necessarily preclude the 
criminal responsibility of the superior".82 The court noted that it is impossible to lay down strict 
guidelines on what might constitute necessary and reasonable measures outside of the context of the 
facts of a particular case.83  
  
77  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (June 8 1977) 1125 UNTS 3 Art 85 [First Protocol] 
Art 86(2). 
78  Celebici Case Trial Judgment, para 387-393; Celebici Case Trial Judgment, above, paras 330-400; 
Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") 
("Celebici" Case) Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 20 February 2001) paras 182 - 314 [Celebici Case Appeal 
Judgment] <http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001) paras 
231 - 236. 
79  Celebici Case Appeal Judgment, above, paras 238-239. 
80  Celebici Case Appeal Judgment, above, paras 248-268. 
81  "It has also been suggested that the concept of reasonableness is difficult to apply in this context since it 
requires a balancing of social costs and benefits when there are no accepted norms regarding the relative 
value of such things as war crimes prevention and military success." Andrew D Mitchell "Failure to Halt, 
Prevent or Punish: The Doctrine of Command Responsibility for War Crimes" 22 Sydney L Rev 381, 409. 
82  Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") 
("Celebici" Case) Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 16 November 1998) para 417 [Celebici Case Trial Judgment] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001) para 395. 
83  Celebici Case Trial Judgment, above, paras 394-395. 
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Given that there is an "effective control" test to found a superior-subordinate relationship, the 
nature of that control on the facts of a given case will affect what might constitute necessary and 
reasonable measures. Under some circumstances reporting the matter to "the competent authorities" 
may be sufficient to discharge this obligation.84 The factual framework of the superior-subordinate 
relationship, both de facto and de jure, the degree of control asserted, and the measures reasonably 
open to a superior in a given situation, to name just a few possible factors, will determine in a given 
fact situation what would have constituted necessary and reasonable measures. 
IV CIVILIAN SUPERIORS AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 
Of particular concern in the scenario under consideration here is the applicability of the doctrine 
of command responsibility to civilian superiors. Several civilian superiors were tried following the 
Second World War.85 The ICTY's elucidation of customary international law includes the 
possibility of civilian superiors being found criminally liable under the doctrine of command 
responsibility.86 In 1998 the Prime Minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda pleaded guilty to various 
crimes before the ICTR, including counts under the ICTR's command responsibility provision.87 
This was the first conviction of a Head of Government by an international tribunal. The Indictments 
of Radovan Karadzic88 and Slobodan Milosevic,89 the former Bosnian Serb Head of State for the 
Bosnian Serb Republic and the former Head of State of the FRY, include criminal liability on this 
basis. Milosevic is currently on trial at the ICTY, the first former Head of State to ever be tried by 
an international tribunal.  
The elements required for a civilian leader under the doctrine of command responsibility are the 
same three discussed above for military commanders, with the exception of the definition of the 
  
84  The Prosecutor v Thomir Blaskic Judgment IT-95-14 (ICTY, 3 March 2000) [Blaskic] <http://www.un.org/ 
icty/blaskic/trialc1/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 12 August 2001) para 336.  
85  For example, United States v Soemu Toyoda Official Transcript of Record of Trial [Toyoda]; Trial of 
Friederich Flick et al Vol VI TWC [Flick]; Government Commissioner v Roechling 14 TWC [Roechling]. 
86  Celebici Case Trial Judgment, above, para 355-363. The Trial Chamber considered the trial of some civilian 
leaders under the doctrine by the Tokyo Tribunal, as well as the Flick case, above, and the Roechling, case 
from Germany, above. 
87  Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda ICTR-97-23-S (ICTR September 4, 1998) <http://www.un.org/ictr/english/ 
judgments/kambanda.html> (last accessed 15 August 2001). Kambanda plead guilty to counts under Art 
6(3) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art 3 [ICTR Statute] 
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html> (last accessed 10 August 2001). 
88  Indictment Prosecutor v Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic (ICTY, July 1995)  <http://www.un.org/ 
icty/indictment/english/kar-ii950724e.htm> (last accessed 12 July 2001). 
89  Amended Indictment Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub, 
Vlajko Stojilkovic IT-99-37-I (ICTY, 29 June 2001) <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-
ai010629e.htm> (last accessed 12 July 2001).  
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superior-subordinate relationship. The ICTY's Aleksovski judgment90 considered that a civilian's 
position as a superior needed to be analogous to a military commanders, but that the civilian's 
"sanctioning power must be interpreted broadly". A civilian in most cases will not have the same 
extent of de jure powers a military commander has, for instance to arrest and charge an offender 
through the military discipline system. A civilian superior's ability de jure or de facto to impose 
sanctions is not essential to liability; the possibility of transmitting reports to the appropriate 
authorities may be enough to found liability.91 These qualifications may mitigate the restrictiveness 
of the Celebici conclusion that "… the doctrine of superior responsibility extends to civilian 
superiors only to the extent that they exercise a degree of control over their subordinates which is 
similar to that of military commanders."92 
This broader interpretation of the sanctioning power of a civilian superior, in order to satisfy the 
"effective control" test, impacts on the third requirement for failure to take necessary and reasonable 
measures. As noted above the interpretation of what necessary and reasonable measures are in a 
given case has to be determined within the context of the facts of the case. It follows from the 
effective control test, and the requirement to take measures within the superior's "material 
responsibility", that the nature of the control will be determinative of what constitutes necessary and 
reasonable measures. The civilian superior's lack of the coercive de jure authority vested in military 
commanders will necessarily dictate a different set of requirements to be discharged to meet their 
duty to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish.  
The ICC Statute's provision for non-military command responsibility departs from the ICTY 
formulation. The ICC Statute structures its provisions on the doctrine of command responsibility in 
two parts, Article 28(a) covering a military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander, and Article 28(b) covering any other superior-subordinate relationship. The mens rea 
requirement for non-military indirect command responsibility in Article 28(b) is narrower than that 
determined in the Celebici case, requiring "the superior either knew, or consciously disregarded 
information which clearly indicated that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such 
crimes"93 [emphasis added]. 
  
90  Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski Judgment IT-95-14/1 (ICTY, 25 June 1999) [Aleksovski] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/trialc/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001). 
91  Aleksovski, above, para 78. 
92  Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") 
("Celebici" Case) Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 16 November 1998) para 417 [Celebici Case Trial Judgment] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001) para 378. 
93  Under Art 126 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (1998) 37 ILM 998 
[ICC Statute] Art 28(b)(i). Contrasted with "Knew or had reason to know" in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as amended 30 November 2000 by Resolution 1329 [ICTY 
Statute] <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000_con.htm> (last accessed 16 August 2001). Art 7(3). 
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In addition to the Celebici Ccse elements, the ICC Statute requires that in the case of non-
military superiors the crimes concerned are activities within the effective authority and control of 
the superior.94 The meaning of this extra element is unclear.95 Vetter notes that:96 
… it is difficult to assess whether the ICC civilian standard is a departure from prior 
customary international law for civilian command responsibility for two reasons: (1) The 
holdings of the handful of civilian cases tried after World War II are subject to various 
interpretations, and (2) the source of a civilian superior's duty may be difficult to determine 
and may be less onerous than a military commander's duty. 
The ICC formulation of the doctrine of command responsibility with respect to non-military 
superiors is arguably not international custom yet. The Celebici case is currently the most 
authoritative statement of the content of international custom,97 while only 80 States have ratified 
the ICC Statute.98 If all the 139 signatories ratify the ICC Statute then this may lead to some change 
in the customary position, though with some uncertainty as regards some of the persistent 
objectors.99  
The current international customary law doctrine of command responsibility, as regards civilian 
superiors, seems therefore to consist of: 
  
94  ICC Statute, above, Art 28(b)(ii). 
95  Greg R Vetter "Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court" 
(2000) 25 Yale J Int'l L 89, 95, 119 - 120. 
96  Vetter, above, 110. 
97  Vetter, above, 111. 
98  <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp> (last accessed 
18 September 2002). 
99  For the persistent objector rule see Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1951) ICJ Rep 116. In this instance 
there were a small number of States that participated at the Rome Conference who did not sign the ICC 
Statute. The most significant was the United States of America. The statute was signed by the USA on 31 
December 2000, however the Bush administration repudiated the treaty on 6 May 2002, with a 
communication to the United Nations Secretary General that "in connection with the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the United States does not intend to become a 
party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on 
December 31, 2000. The United States requests that its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this 
letter, be reflected in the depositary's status lists relating to this treaty." <http://untreaty.un.org/ 
ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp#N6> (last accessed 19 September 
2002). The United States has since carried on a campaign to try to gain immunity for its soldiers from the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. BBC News Online "Washington Seeks Troop Immunity" 20 June 2002 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2056005.stm> (last accessed 19 September 2002). 
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(1) The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship characterised by the superior having 
effective control over the subordinate.100 The control has to be analogous to that of 
military commander, but the civilian superior's sanctioning powers must be interpreted 
broadly.101 
(2) The superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had 
been committed. This is either actual knowledge, which can be inferred from the 
circumstances and evidence,102 or the commander must have been in possession of some 
information sufficient to put them on notice.103 
(3) The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal 
act or punish the perpetrator thereof. Such measures must be within the material 
possibility for the superior.104 
With these qualifications in mind, are the three necessary elements made out for Clinton and 
Blair, with respect to the three incidents this paper is assuming are prima facie war crimes? 
V THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAIR/CLINTON 
A The Existence of a Superior – Subordinate Relationship 
Both Clinton and Blair were clearly in a position of direct superior authority vis-à-vis their own 
forces in the NATO coalition. As Head of State and Head of Government respectively, Clinton and 
Blair had sufficient authority, both de jure and de facto, to order measures to prevent offences or 
punish offenders within their own forces. Clinton, as President of the United States, is 
  
100  Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") 
("Celebici" Case) Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 16 November 1998) para 417 [Celebici Case Trial Judgment] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001) para 378. 
101  Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski Judgment IT-95-14/1 (ICTY, 25 June 1999) [Aleksovski] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/trialc/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001) para 78. 
102  Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") 
("Celebici" Case) Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 16 November 1998) para 417 [Celebici Case Trial Judgment] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001); this principle is 
enshrined under Art 126 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (1998) 37 
ILM 998 [ICC Statute], Art 22, paras 228-230. 
103  Celebici Case Trial Judgment, above, para 387-393; Celebici Case Trial Judgment, above, paras 330-400; 
Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") 
("Celebici" Case) Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 20 February 2001) paras 182-314 [Celebici Case Appeal 
Judgment] <http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001) paras 
231-236. 
104  Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") 
("Celebici" Case) Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 16 November 1998) para 417 [Celebici Case Trial Judgment] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001), para 395. 
 
 NATO AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN THE KOSOVO CAMPAIGN 37  
constitutionally the Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces. Blair, as Prime 
Minister, is in a position of constitutional responsibility for the activities of the Executive Branch of 
Government. Both men would also meet the additional requirement from the ICC Statute for the 
activities concerned to be within their effective control, if that requirement was part of customary 
law. 
B Direct Liability 
Clinton and Blair could be held criminally liable if they ordered, instigated or planned any of the 
attacks that constituted a war crime. The only incident for which direct liability might arise is the 
attack on RTS. This direct liability would accrue if RTS were a civilian rather than a military object, 
turning the attack into a direct attack on the civilian population causing death in violation of Article 
85(3)(a) of the First Protocol. The OTP concluded, on the evidence, that "insofar as the attack 
actually was aimed at disrupting the communications network, it was legally acceptable."105 The 
qualification in the finding was because NATO justified the attack on two grounds: that RTS was a 
command, control and communications centre;106 and on the grounds that it was used for a 
propaganda purpose.107 If NATO had based the attack purely on the latter ground the attack would 
probably have been illegal.108 
The other criticisms of the attack, on the basis that it was a military target, revolve around 
allegations that it violated other principles of the laws and customs of war requiring 
proportionality109 and adequate warning.110 Clinton and Blair's direct involvement would most 
likely have been at the highest strategic level, the decision to attack. The timing and means of attack 
were operational and tactical decisions taken by their subordinates. Liability for violating these 
  
105  Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [OTP Final Report] para 75. 
106  OTP Final Report, above, paras 72-73. 
107  OTP Final Report, above, para 74. 
108  The OTP are less direct, finding that "… its legality might well be questioned by some experts in the field of 
humanitarian law" OTP Final Report, above, para 90. 
109  OTP Final Report, above, paras 48–52; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (June 8 1977) 1125 
UNTS 3 Article 85 [First Protocol] Art 57(2)(a)(iii). 
110  Article 85 (3) "The following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches, when committed wilfully, in 
violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death … (b) launching an indiscriminate 
attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects …" Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) (June 8 1977) 1125 UNTS 3 Article 85 [First Protocol]. 
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principles, arguably thereby causing the attack to become "indiscriminate", would be for indirect 
command responsibility.  
For the other two attacks the alleged war crimes arose from the manner of attack, decided by the 
pilot working within their rules of engagement after the target had been selected. Neither Blair or 
Clinton were in a position to prevent these incidents, so any liability that might arise must do so 
through failure to punish the pilots if in fact a war crime was committed. 
C Indirect Liability 
For each of the incidents both men could potentially be held liable through the doctrine of 
command responsibility if they failed to prevent or punish war crimes. As discussed above, once the 
superior-subordinate relationship has been established liability for the crimes of subordinates will be 
founded if it is established that: 
(1) The superior knew or had reason to know that an offence was about to be committed, or 
had been committed; and 
(2) The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or 
to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
1 Mens rea – knew or had reason to know 
There is little difficulty in satisfying the mens rea requirement for both Clinton and Blair. The 
international media broadcast the facts of each of the attacks globally, while the campaign was still 
underway.111 NATO press briefings revealed the relevant facts of each of the incidents, in a matter 
of days.112 Given the sensitivity of any civilian casualties, and the potential to undermine support 
for NATO's actions, it is also likely that Clinton and Blair were receiving detailed briefings from 
their Defence Staff and NATO. 
From the scrutiny and exposure by the international media, as well as statements made by 
Clinton and Blair, it would be possible to infer actual knowledge of the circumstances of the attacks 
giving rise to questions of their legality. Even if there were insufficient evidence to infer actual 
knowledge, the "had reason to know" test would be met. Both Clinton and Blair would have been in 
  
111  For example, the attack on the refugee convoys at Djakovica: BBC News Online "NATO: We May Have 
Killed Refugees" (19 April 1999) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/ 
newsid_323000/323248.stm> (last accessed 21 August 2001).  
112  For the Grdelica attack, Press Conference NATO HQ Brussels (13 April 1999) <http://www.nato.int/ 
kosovo/press/p990413a.htm> (last accessed 21 August 2001); for the Djakovica attack, Press Conference 
NATO HQ Brussels (15 April 1999) <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990415a.htm> (accessed 21 
August 2001); for the attack on RTS, Press Conference NATO HQ Brussels (23 April 1999) 
<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990423l.htm> (accessed 21 August 2001). 
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possession of sufficient information to put them on notice that war crimes may have been 
committed.113 
The discussion so far has focused on a failure to punish after the alleged offence was committed. 
If either man knew that such offences were likely to occur then they would be liable for failure to 
prevent them. Each of the alleged offences arises from tactical decisions taken by the pilots in the 
developing situation of the attack, or in the case of RTS an operational decision by NATO 
Command on the time and manner of the attack. It would be difficult to argue Clinton and Blair 
could have foreseen the situations and acted to prevent them. The only basis for such an argument 
would seem to be that the requirement to operate above 15,000 feet made lawful application of the 
laws of war "virtually impossible", and therefore there was a requirement to take action to prevent 
possible breaches, by reducing this limit.114 However the evidence does not seem to bear out this 
claim, as the statistics quoted above show. If operating above 15,000 feet made operating lawfully 
"virtually impossible" then one would expect far more than 0.9% of sorties to lead to civilian deaths. 
It seems therefore that, on the evidence, there is an insufficient basis to allege a failure by Clinton 
and Blair to prevent the commission of offences. 
2 Failure to take necessary and reasonable measures 
The last element required for omission-based command responsibility is the failure to take 
necessary and reasonable measures to either prevent the commission of crimes, or to punish the 
offenders if the crimes are committed. The discussion so far has concluded that both Clinton and 
Blair are superiors, both de jure and de facto, and that they knew or had reason to know that these 
three attacks may have constituted war crimes. Proceeding on the assumption that they are in fact 
prima facie war crimes, if the two leaders failed to take reasonable and necessary measures to 
punish the perpetrators they should be personally liable for the crimes.   
NATO claimed to have initiated investigations into some of the incidents that are alleged to 
have comprised war crimes. However, the only incident that has given rise to any form of 
disciplinary proceedings is the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The United States 
admitted responsibility, paid compensation to the families and the Chinese Government, a number 
of CIA officers were reprimanded and one was dismissed. No criminal proceedings have been 
undertaken.115 
  
113 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka "Pavo"), Hazim Delic and Esad Landžo (aka "Zenga") 
("Celebici" Case) Judgment IT-96-21 (ICTY, 16 November 1998) para 417 [Celebici Case Trial Judgment] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 3 July 2001) paras 387 - 393. 
114  NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "'Collateral Damage' or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws 
of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force" (EUR 70/018/2000) [Amnesty Report] 
<http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/EUR700182000>  (last accessed on 1 July 2001) s 4. 
115 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para 84. 
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The main difficulty in this area is the lack of evidence of what, if any, measures NATO took 
following these incidents. Were internal investigations undertaken? Was the fact that such 
investigations were undertaken, and the results of those investigations, made known to Clinton and 
Blair? All of the participating NATO countries have Legal Departments in their armed forces and 
these may have carried out investigations of the lawfulness of questionable incidents. Most military 
organisations would carry out an investigation as a matter of course after an attack had gone wrong. 
For example, the United States pilots involved in a friendly fire attack in Afghanistan are being 
charged with manslaughter as the result of an investigation into the incident.116 
If an investigation is conducted in good faith, and with due diligence, and it concludes that there 
was no breach of the laws or customs of war then that may negate the mens rea or the actus reus, or 
perhaps both, for indirect command responsibility. The commander would not know that a war 
crime was committed, as they would have a reasonable belief that in fact no offence had occurred, 
nor could it be argued they should have known because the initial reports that indicated an offence 
might have been committed had been contradicted by an investigation in good faith and with due 
diligence. The actus reus of "failure to take necessary and reasonable measures" could be negated as 
the initiation and completion of an investigation to determine if an offence had been committed, 
provided the investigation was conducted to a sufficient standard, should constitute reasonable 
measures. However, if a prosecution were brought it would be for a court or tribunal to assess 
whether the investigation and its findings were reasonable, and whether it was reasonable for the 
superior to rely on the findings. Otherwise superiors could escape criminal liability by relying on 
sham investigations, and turning their mind from considering the merits of the investigation. 
The only material that has been found that might illuminate this point is contained in the ICC 
Statute117 at Article 17. Under Article 17, the ICC is denied jurisdiction over an offence where a 
State with jurisdiction is currently investigating the offence, has investigated and decided not to 
prosecute, or has already tried the alleged offender for the offence, unless the actions of the State are 
being taken to effectively shield the person from responsibility.118 The legal test for determining 
whether an investigation has been sufficient to defeat the jurisdiction of the ICC is not entirely clear 
from the provisions, though Article 17(2)(c) refers to the need for the proceedings to be "conducted 
independently or impartially". An internal investigation by NATO, or by the member State whose 
aircraft was involved in an incident, may be challenged on the grounds of a lack of independence, 
  
116  BBC News Online "Pilots Charged Over 'Friendly Fire' Deaths" (13 September 2002) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2256146.stm> (last accessed 19 September 2002). A cynic 
might attribute the decision to prosecute in this instance to the fact it was friendly troops, Canadians, that 
were killed. There has not been any prosecutions for instances where civilians have been killed by mistake. 
117  Under Art 126 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (1998) 37 ILM 998 
[ICC Statute]. 
118  ICC Statute, above, Art 17 and Art 20(3). 
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and would therefore need to be conducted in a fashion that will establish it was impartial, or by this 
test it could fail to defeat the ICC's jurisdiction. While not clearly on the point of "necessary and 
reasonable measures" for a commander, it does suggest that a sufficiently independent or impartial 
investigation should constitute necessary and reasonable measures. 
Are internal investigations by NATO, or by one of the member States, sufficient to satisfy the 
"necessary and reasonable measures" requirement imposed by the doctrine of command 
responsibility, or to negate the mens rea of Clinton and Blair? Without access to the investigation 
terms of reference and findings there is no way to know if these investigations were conducted in a 
sufficiently independent or impartial manner that would render them such. However, the debate over 
the lawfulness of these incidents illustrates that they are not clear violations of the laws and customs 
of war. It could well be open for a properly conducted investigation to find that no violation 
occurred, and it is therefore possible that properly conducted investigations were conducted that 
could negate the mens rea or actus reus for indirect command responsibility. 
D  Liability for Omission to Act and the RTS Strike: Command Responsibility and Multinational 
Coalitions: a Diffusion of Responsibility? 
Operation Allied Force was an example of a multinational coalition force in action. Western 
armies seem to accept that the formation of coalitions will be the normal way of reacting to and 
meeting threats in the future.119 This has been seen in recent military operations under the United 
Nations aegis,120 and regionally based operations.121 The command and control of multinational 
coalitions is a complex web of military and political constraints, and the force commander will in 
many cases not have full and unrestricted command of all the various national elements in the 
coalition. Individual national contingents will often relay orders back to their nations for military 
and political decision-makers to consider whether they are compatible with national objectives and 
restrictions. 
What are the implications of coalition operations for the doctrine of command responsibility? 
Amnesty International claims that:122 
  
119  For example, Major General Robert H Scales writes: "For the foreseeable future the United States will 
remain reluctant to intervene unilaterally in most crises; as a consequence, the need for coalition partners 
will shape American strategy." Robert H Scales "Future Warfare Anthology" (US Army War College, 
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 1999). 
120  The Gulf War 1990, Somalia (UNOSOM), Bosnia (UNPROFOR), East Timor (UNTAET). 
121  The intervention by ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and Liberia, NATO actions in Bosnia (IFOR then SFOR) 
and Kosovo (Operation Just Cause and then KFOR). 
122  NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "'Collateral Damage' or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws 
of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force" (EUR 70/018/2000) [Amnesty Report] 
<http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/EUR700182000> (last accessed on 1 July 2001) s 2.4. 
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Operation Allied Force was fought by a coalition of NATO member states in the name of the alliance as 
a whole … at no point during the air campaign did any alliance member publicly repudiate any of the 
attacks carried out by NATO forces. Therefore each NATO member may incur responsibility for the 
military actions carried out under the NATO aegis. 
This proposition has two aspects, State responsibility for each and every war crime committed 
by NATO, and individual criminal responsibility through the doctrine of command responsibility. 
The first aspect is not within the scope of this discussion. In terms of individual criminal 
responsibility, is this Amnesty International proposition supportable? As noted above the idea that 
command responsibility is a strict liability offence must be rejected, so there cannot be individual 
liability predicated merely on the fact a military or civilian superior is a member of NATO, and 
failed to repudiate attacks that were of questionable legality. Any liability would have to be 
predicated on satisfaction of the legal tests discussed above for the doctrine of command 
responsibility. What the Amnesty proposition does highlight is the potential difficulties that 
complex multi-national coalitions with complex, and blurred, command and control relationships 
pose to the doctrine of command responsibility. 
The strike on RTS provides an example of this. Amnesty alleges that there was disagreement 
among the NATO partners as to the legality of the strike on RTS. As a result one nation, reportedly 
the United States, went ahead with the attack despite the objections of the other NATO partners.123 
If that strike did, in the event, constitute a war crime could criminal liability be attributed to the 
superiors of the other, objecting, NATO partners? 
The difficulty for analysis is in determining whether the military and relevant political superiors 
had the necessary control over the United States to prevent the bombing. Given that the relationship 
is a complex, and to some extent indeterminate mix, of military and political influence a court might 
have some difficulty in determining if there was the requisite control. Also the degree of control will 
vary with each nation; so Spain's influence with the United States may be less than the United 
Kingdom's. The national element that conducted the strike may have done so without the command 
approval of NATO command. What then is the position of the various commanders in the NATO 
hierarchy? It is important to note that the test of effective control, and the fact that such control can 
be indirect and de facto, means that more than one superior may be held responsible for a crime 
committed by a subordinate.124 So where the relevant tests set out for the doctrine of command 
responsibility are met liability could extend across a coalition, and not just directly up the chain of 
command. 
  
123  Amnesty Report, above, s 5.3, citing press reports. 
124  The Prosecutor v Thomir Blaskic Judgment IT-95-14 (ICTY, 3 March 2000) [Blaskic] 
<http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialc1/judgment/index.htm> (last accessed 12 August 2001) para 303. 
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What constitute necessary and reasonable measures in the context of a complex coalition? 
Assume that NATO's humanitarian intervention was lawful. What constitute necessary and 
reasonable measures given the political necessity to hold together a complex multinational coalition 
to achieve a lawful objective? This is a difficult question. It is not within the scope of this paper to 
address these complex issues. Suffice to say that they are real and important issues, given the shift 
that most developed nations are making to the concept of the multinational coalition as the standard 
force structure to confront the security challenges of the twenty-first century.  
These difficulties do present a major challenge for any prosecution of Clinton and Blair. The 
identity of the aircraft and pilots involved in the incidents is not certain. If they were United States 
aircraft, does Blair escape the possibility of liability? Conversely, if the aircraft were from the 
United Kingdom does Clinton escape liability? Or do both men escape liability because their 
national forces were detached from national command and operating under NATO leadership? 
Problems of proof were identified as one of the factors in the OTP decision that no further 
investigation was warranted.125 The only incident where this may not impede prosecution is direct 
command responsibility for ordering the attack on RTS, if it was a civilian object and not a military 
target, as liability is incurred for giving the orders and the identity of the attacking aircraft is 
irrelevant. 
VI SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY 
Assuming that criminal liability could be founded through the doctrine of command 
responsibility, what protection do Clinton and Blair receive from their positions as a former Head of 
State and current Head of Government a under international law? International law has traditionally 
granted immunities to the Head of State and to diplomats, though the extent of this immunity has 
been narrowed over time. In conflict with this doctrine of sovereign immunity is the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility for serious international crimes.  
A The International Law Principles of Sovereign Immunity and Individual Criminal 
Responsibility 
1 The principle of sovereign immunity 
Traditional head of state immunity, as a norm of customary international law, was an aspect of 
sovereign immunity. This is a principle that acts to prevent the courts of one State sitting in 
  
125  "In all cases, either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition 
of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against high level accused or against lower accused for 
particularly heinous offences." Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the 
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para 90. 
 
44 (2002) 33 VUWLR 
judgment on the acts of another State.126 This principle has its roots in the equality of States at the 
international level.127  The extension of sovereign immunity to the Head of State was based in the 
idea of the Head of State, the sovereign, as the personification of the State.128 In their domestic law, 
States base head of state immunity on such grounds as sovereign immunity, diplomatic immunity 
and the Act of State doctrine.129  
The initial restrictions on the doctrine of head of state immunity came within the field of civil 
law, drawing a distinction between private acts and official acts, particularly in the case of 
commercial transactions,130 though the recognition of these exceptions is not universal.131 The 
immunity of Heads of State belongs to the State, and not the person, so that the State may waive its 
immunity for a Head of State or diplomat.132 The analysis of sovereign immunity in the Pinochet133 
decision drew a distinction between the immunity enjoyed by a sitting Head of State and that 
  
126  Gilbert Sison "Recent Development: A King No More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine 
of Head of State Immunity" (2000) 78 Wash ULQ 1583, 1584–1587. 
127  This principle is reflected in The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
<http://www.un.org/icty/index.html> (last accessed 20 July 2001) [ICTY]; International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda <http://www.ictr.org/> (last accessed 10 June 2001) [ICTR]. The ICTY was created pursuant to 
the Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993 <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S-RES-
827_93.htm> (last accessed 12 August 2001); the ICTR was created by the Security Council Resolution 955 
of 8 November 1994 <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/Resolutions/955e.htm> (last accessed 12 August 
2001). Both tribunals were established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations [UN Charter] 
<http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch-cont.htm> (last accessed 12 August 2001) at Art 2(1). 
128  Joint (separate) opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (14 February 2002) ICJ para 80 
[DRC v Belgium Joint Separate Opinion] <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/ 
icobe_ijudgment_20020214_higgins-kooijmans-buergenthal.PDF> (last accessed 20 September 2002). The 
facts of the case are discussed in the majority decision, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (14 February 2002) ICJ [DRC v Belgium] 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF> (last 
accessed 20 September 2002).  
129  Sison, above, 1584–1585. 
130  Governor of Pitcairn and Associated Islands v Sutton [1995] 1 NZLR 426, 428 (CA) Cooke P. 
131  For example, Russia adheres to a view of absolute immunity, Gilbert Sison "Recent Development: A King 
No More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine of Head of State Immunity" (2000) 78 Wash 
ULQ 1587. 
132  Ruth Wedgwood "40th Anniversary Perspective: International Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet" (2000) 
40 Va J Int'l L 829, 838. 
133  Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996 Art 18 [ILC Draft Code] 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm> (last accessed 1 April 2001). The Draft Code was 
provisionally adopted in 1988: Regina v Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and 
Others, Ex Parte Pinochet; Regina v Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 
and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet [1999] UKHL 17, Lord Goff, paras 83 - 84 [Pinochet].  
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enjoyed by a former Head of State. A current Head of State's immunity attaches to their person 
(ratione personae) and is an absolute procedural immunity, while a former Head of State's immunity 
attaches only to official acts performed in their official capacity (ratione materiae).134 This analysis 
seems to be supported by the recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium)135 which dealt with the 
immunities of a Foreign Minister, but did so by effectively assimilating their position to that of 
Head of State.136 The ICJ concluded that a Foreign Minister had an absolute immunity to 
prosecution by domestic courts whilst in office,137 and once removed from office retained a 
substantive immunity for any official acts performed whilst in office.138 This is effectively the 
ratione personae/ratione materiae distinction. The other significance of this case for the purposes of 
the examination of Tony Blair's liability is that as a Head of Government he will enjoy immunities 
that are at least as extensive as a Foreign Minister's. 
  
134 Sison, above, 1588. 
135  Joint (separate) opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (14 February 2002) ICJ para 80 
[DRC v Belgium Joint Separate Opinion] <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/ 
icobe_ijudgment_20020214_higgins-kooijmans-buergenthal.PDF> (last accessed 20 September 2002). The 
facts of the case are discussed in the majority decision, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (14 February 2002) ICJ [DRC v Belgium] 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF> (last 
accessed 20 September 2002). Belgium issued an international arrest warrant against the Foreign Minister of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) under a domestic law giving Belgian courts universal 
jurisdiction over breaches of international humanitarian law, DRC v Belgium, above, para 15. The charges 
against the Minister, Mr Ndombasi, included grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols and 
crimes against humanity, DRC v Belgium, above, para 13. The DRC took the case before the ICJ seeking a 
declaration that Belgium was acting in violation of international law on the basis of "…the rule of 
customary international law concerning the absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal process of 
incumbent foreign ministers", and an order that Belgium recall and cancel the unlawful warrant. This was a 
majority decision by 13 votes to three, Judges Oda, Al-Kwasawneh and Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert 
dissenting. However, a further three judges in a separate opinion found faults with some of the reasoning of 
the majority, in particular the failure to address the issue of jurisdiction prior to that of immunity, suggesting 
that "In agreeing to pronounce upon the question of immunity without addressing the question of a 
jurisdiction from which there could be immunity, the Court has allowed itself to be manoeuvred into 
answering a hypothetical question." DRC v Belgium Joint Separate Opinion, above, para 17.  
136  The majority has arguably assimilated the immunities of a Foreign Minister to that of Head of State as the 
immunities they identify tally exactly with those of a Head of State, immunity ratione personae while in 
office and ratione materiae after they have left office. 
137  The possibility of prosecution by an international tribunal or Court is left open, Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (14 February 2002) ICJ [DRC v 
Belgium] <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF> 
(last accessed 20 September 2002) para 61. 
138  DRC v Belgium Joint (separate) opinion, above.  For the facts see DRC v Belgium, above, see paras 54-55 
and 61. 
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2 The principle of individual criminal responsibility and irrelevance of official position 
Since World War Two, with respect to serious international crimes, international custom has 
restricted the application of this doctrine of sovereign immunity.139 The Nürnberg Tribunal in 
Article 7 of its charter excluded any immunity based on official status, including that of Head of 
State or Head of Government.140 This provision was included in the Tokyo Charter at Article 6, the 
ICTY Statute at Article 7(2), 141 the ICTR Statute at Article 6,142 the ICC Statute at Article 27,143 
and was recognised by the ILC in the Nürnberg principles at Principle III,144 and the ILC Draft 
Code at Article 7.145  
This principle of individual criminal responsibility denies substantive immunity to international 
criminals, though their sovereign immunity will provide procedural immunity before domestic 
courts146 and even perhaps international tribunals.147 The reasoning of the Pinochet decision148 is to 
  
139  Though the possibility of its individual criminal liability overcoming sovereign immunity was mooted after 
the First World War, see the Commission on Responsibility Report, above, 122–123.  
140  Article 6 of the Charter provides that "Leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are 
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan." Agreement for the Prosecution 
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal. London, 8 August 1945 [Nürnberg Charter] <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ 
385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/59e5a3f396d98cc3c125641e00405ea7?OpenDocument> (last 
accessed 9 August 2001). This incorporates the first limb of command responsibility as discussed below, 
liability for positive acts, but makes no mention of liability for omission to prevent or punish, or indirect 
liability: Art 7. 
141  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as amended 30 November 2000 
by Resolution 1329 [ICTY Statute] <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000_con.htm> (last accessed 
16 August 2001) Art 7(2). 
142 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Article 3 [ICTR Statute] <http://www.ictr.org/ 
ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html> (last accessed 10 August 2001) Art 6. 
143 Under Art 126 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (1998) 37 ILM 998 
[ICC Statute] Art 27. 
144  Principles of International Law Recognised in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of 
the Tribunal, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, Vol III. 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/nurnfra.htm> (last accessed 4 July 2001)   
145  Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996 Art 18 [ILC Draft Code] 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm> (last accessed 1 April 2001). 
146 The facts of the case are discussed in the majority decision, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (14 February 2002) ICJ [DRC v Belgium] 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF> (last 
accessed 20 September 2002).  
147  "Princeton Principles" on Universal Jurisdiction (2001, Princeton University) [Princeton Principles] 48-51 
<http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf> (last accessed 29 August 2001). DRC v Belgium, above. 
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deny that international crimes can be "official acts" carried out in the public capacity of the 
individual, and therefore protected by immunity ratione materiae.149 This is an important point as 
many of the most serious international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and 
torture, tend to be carried out by States as official policy, with State officials deciding on and 
implementing the policy. If immunity ratione materiae protects all official acts, and the acts that 
constitute these serious crimes are characterised as official acts, then sovereign immunity will 
effectively result in impunity for the most serious offenders. A Head of State who planned and 
ordered the acts would escape liability while the individual who follows their orders unshielded by 
that immunity can be prosecuted. This difficulty is recognised in some of the separate opinions in 
the DRC v Belgium case, but is not an issue addressed by the majority.150  
How far do these various instruments reflect the state of international customary law? The ICTY 
considers its Statute to be reflective of customary international law, and it is interpreted to be 
consistent with custom as at the time of the offences.151 The quality of the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunal lends some support to its claims. The ILC also considers that this principle of individual 
  
Para 61 leaves open the possibility of the prosecution of a Foreign Minister by an international Tribunal or 
Court even while in office. For a Foreign Minister therefore the ratione personae attached to their position 
is opposable only to domestic courts. This does not settle the question of the ratione personae of a Head of 
State with respect to international tribunals, which was not at issue before the ICJ. 
148  Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996 Art 18 [ILC Draft Code] 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm> (last accessed 1 April 2001). The Draft Code was 
provisionally adopted in 1988: Regina v Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and 
Others, Ex Parte Pinochet; Regina v Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 
and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet [1999] UKHL 17, Lord Goff, paras 83 - 84 [Pinochet]. 
149  Andrea Bianchi "Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case" EJIL On-line Section 2D 
<http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/No2/art1-02.html#TopOfPage> (last accessed 19 August 2001).  
150  Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (14 
February 2002) ICJ [DRC v Belgium] <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/ 
icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF> (last accessed 20 September 2002),  para 85; Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Al-Khasawneh in DRC v Belgium, para 6 [DRC v Belgium Al-Khasawneh Dissent] <http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214_al-khasawneh.PDF> (last 
accessed 22 September 2002); Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert in DRC v Belgium, para 36 
[DRC v Belgium Van Den Wyngaert dissent] <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/ 
icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214_vdwyngaert.PDF> (last accessed 22 September 2002). 
151  The ICTY has jurisdiction over offences committed within the territories of the Former Yugoslavia from 1 
January 1991, ICTY Statute, above, Art 1. The ICTY's consideration of international law is grounded in this 
time period, and subsequent developments, such as the emergence of the ICC, may effect changes on the 
content of customary international law in the future. See below para 31. 
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accountability even for Heads of State or Government is reflective of custom, as developed after 
World War Two and reflected in the various international instruments cited above.152  
State practice in many cases may seem to belie this principle. Many States harbour former 
Heads of State from justice: Idi Amin in Saudi Arabia, Mengistu Haile Mariam in Zimbabwe, Jean 
Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier in France, to name a few.153 However, the fact that some States 
deviate from an otherwise accepted norm does not prevent that norm hardening into a rule of 
customary international law.154 On the other side of the ledger, the former president of FRY, 
Milosevic, is currently being tried before the ICTY.155 As noted above the Prime Minister of 
Rwanda has already been convicted by the ICTR. The State practice evidenced by the Tribunals 
following the World War Two, the attitude of States to the formation of the ICTY and ICTR under 
Chapter VII of the Charter,156 and the wide consensus on the Statute of the ICC,157 all constitute 
evidence of opinio juris and State practice.  
  
152  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session (6 May-26 July 1996) 
General Assembly Official Records - Fifty-first Session Supplement No. 10 (A/51/10), Chapter II, 
commentary on Art 7, para 6 [ILC Report 1996] <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/96repfra.htm> 
(last accessed 15 August 2001). 
153  Mary Margaret Penrose "It's Good to be the King!: Prosecuting Heads of State and Former Heads of State 
Under International Law" 39 Colum J Transnat'l L 193, 196. 
154  State practice must be consistent, not rigidly uniform, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Merits) [1986] ICJ Reports 14, 99–100 [Nicaragua Case]. 
155  CNN "Lawyer Says Milosevic to Accept Help" (4 July 2001) http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/ 
07/03/milosevic.court/index.html (last accessed 12 August 2001); Ruth Wedgewood "Former Yugoslav 
President Slobodan Milosevic To Be Tried in The Hague for Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
Allegedly Committed in Kosovo" ASIL Insights (July 2001) <http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh76.htm> 
(last accessed 20 July 2001). 
156  The Security Resolution itself is not evidence of State practice, but the attitudes of States to the resolution, 
and to the formation and conduct of the Tribunals is. Significantly for the ICTY, the States most concerned 
with the institution have recently cooperated with the ICTY in extraditing some of their indicted nationals. 
For Croatia, see BBC News Online "Croatia's War Crimes Legacy" (16 July 2001) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1441000/1441771.stm> (last accessed 12 August 2001); for Serbia, see 
BBC News Online "Serbs Hand Over War Crimes Suspect" (23 March 2001) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1238000/1238793.stm> (last accessed 12 August 2001), and also the 
transfer of Milosevic to the ICTY, "Milosevic to Accept Help", above, for Bosnia, see BBC News Online 
"More Bosnia Arrests Urged" (3 August 2001) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/ 
newsid_1471000/1471954.stm> (last accessed 12 August 2001). 
157  139 signatories and 80 ratifications to the ICC Statute, <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/ 
englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp> (last accessed 18 September 2002), as at 18 
September 2002. To put this in perspective there are currently 191 member States of the United Nations. 
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The minority of the ICJ in DRC v Belgium, and three judges in the majority, accept that the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility is a part of customary law,158 while the majority note 
only that "immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite 
separate concepts" and do not examine the customary status of the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility.159 What the ICJ denies is that a domestic court can have jurisdiction in the face of 
procedural immunity, in the case of a Foreign Minister. The principle of individual criminal 
responsibility is accepted, it is the application of this principle in the face of sovereign immunity 
that is the point of dispute. 
B The Conflict between the Principle of Sovereign Immunity and Individual Criminal 
Responsibility 
This conflict between the principle of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes, 
regardless of any official capacity, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity is still not fully resolved. 
The ICJ case, if it represents the current international law position,160 seems to have resolved this 
conflict as regards domestic courts. Domestic courts have no basis in international law to take 
jurisdiction in the face of ratione personae immunity, unless the State waives that immunity. 
Domestic courts could take jurisdiction where immunity is only ratione materiae, but only in regard 
to non-official acts, any acts characterised as official retain the sovereign immunity.161 As discussed 
above, it is not clear that the Pinochet reasoning that would exclude serious international crimes 
from classification as an official act is a part of customary international law. However, it is 
suggested that this reasoning is implicit in the customary principle of individual criminal 
  
158  Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (14 
February 2002) ICJ [DRC v Belgium] <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/ 
icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF> (last accessed 20 September 2002), para 7 where Judge Al-Khasawneh 
states this principle is of a jus cogens character and consequently should defeat the non-jus cogens principle 
of immunity; DRC v Belgium Separate Joint Opinion, Joint (separate) opinion of Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (14 February 2002) ICJ para 80 [DRC v Belgium Joint Separate Opinion] 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214_higgins-
kooijmans-buergenthal.PDF> (last accessed 20 September 2002), para 85; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-
Khasawneh in DRC v Belgium, para 6 [DRC v Belgium Al-Khasawneh Dissent] <http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214_al-khasawneh.PDF> (last 
accessed 22 September 2002); Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert in DRC v Belgium, para 36 
[DRC v Belgium Van Den Wyngaert dissent] <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/ 
icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214_vdwyngaert.PDF> (last accessed 22 September 2002) para 74; 
DRC v Belgium Van den Wyngaert dissent, paras 27 – 28. 
159  DRC v Belgium, above, para 60. 
160  The reasoning of the court is very cursory, and there is some force in the criticisms of the dissenting 
judgments, and the separate joint opinion. 
161  DRC v Belgium, above, para 61. 
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responsibility regardless of official capacity, as otherwise that principle is deprived of its meaning 
and force. 
The ICJ does indicate four exceptions where immunity would not lead to impunity:162 
(1) They can be tried domestically within their own State, under domestic law; 
(2) They can be tried by a domestic court of another State where the State they represent 
waives the immunity; 
(3) After they leave office where the domestic court of another State has jurisdiction under 
international law the court can try them for acts committed prior to, or after, their term of 
office, or for acts committed during their term of office committed in a private capacity; 
and 
(4) Where an international tribunal has jurisdiction an incumbent or former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs can be tried. Specific mention is made of the ICTR, ICTY and the ICC. 
A State where the current government, or senior members of it, have allegedly been engaged in 
serious international crimes is unlikely to either prosecute these individuals itself, while they are still 
in power, and nor is the government likely to waive their immunity so they can be tried by the 
domestic court of another State. The possibility of prosecution after they have left office may 
encourage such governments to try to maintain themselves in power by further repression, torture, 
crimes against humanity, and so on in order to avoid justice. Even if they are forced from office the 
classification of what is an "official act" and protected by the continuing immunity ratione materiae 
is not clear.   
The final option, that of international justice, is fraught with difficulties that are the result of the 
Court's reasoning. The Court concludes that not only is there no customary international law that 
allows domestic courts to overcome sovereign immunity,163 but that "… although various 
international conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on 
States obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend their criminal 
jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under customary 
international law, including those of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable before 
the courts of a foreign State, even where those courts exercise such a jurisdiction under these 
conventions."164 
  
162  DRC v Belgium, above, para 61. 
163  DRC v Belgium, above, para 58. 
164  DRC v Belgium, above, para 59. 
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In many States, an individual may only be arrested and extradited to another court, including an 
international court, by a domestic judicial process.165 Therefore, in order for an international court, 
which has no means to effect arrests itself, to actually gain possession of an offender in order to try 
them that offender must first be arrested by a State, and then extradited. Yet according to the 
reasoning of the ICJ the domestic courts cannot gain jurisdiction in the face of the offender's 
sovereign immunity even where domestic courts exercise a jurisdiction under an international 
convention. So even though New Zealand has jurisdiction under the International Crimes and 
International Criminal Court Act 2000, which implements New Zealand's treaty obligations under 
the ICC Statute, to arrest and surrender alleged offenders to the ICC, if New Zealand was to assert 
jurisdiction in order to surrender an individual with sovereign immunity then New Zealand would 
be in breach of international law.166 The Statute of the ICC is an international convention, and 
therefore domestic jurisdiction founded under it is not opposable to sovereign immunity under the 
ICJ's reasoning. This last option to avoid impunity is therefore rendered ineffective by the ICJ's own 
reasoning. A further limitation on this last of the ICJ's options for avoiding impunity is the lack of 
competent international tribunals to try offenders, with the ICTY and ICTR limited jurisdictionally 
by time and geography,167 and the ICC limited by time and by limitations on its jurisdiction over 
States who are not parties to its statute.168 
  
165  Even though the final decision to surrender a person to the ICC under the International Crimes and 
International Criminal Court Act 2000 rests with the Minister of Justice, ss 47–54, in this process New 
Zealand is subjecting the individual to its domestic jurisdiction. On arrest the individual must be taken 
before the District Court, ss 39–41, and the Court must make a determination on the individuals eligibility 
for surrender, s 43:  The right to challenge the arrest via habeus corpus is not excluded, and there are rights 
of appeal to the courts against a surrender order, s 67.  
166  The exception to this may be where a State is acting in accordance with a resolution of the UNSC made 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, which is binding on all States. Both the ICTY and ICTR were created 
under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
167  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as amended 30 November 2000 
by Resolution 1329 [ICTY Statute] <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000_con.htm> (last accessed 
16 August 2001). Art 1; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Article 3 [ICTR Statute] 
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html> (last accessed 10 August 2001) Art 1. 
168  The ICC only has jurisdiction over offences from the time of the entry into force of the Statute (on 1 July 
2002) ICC Statute, Under Art 126 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 
(1998) 37 ILM 998 [ICC Statute], Art 11. However, for States who ratify after 1 July 2002 the court only 
has jurisdiction over crimes after entry into force for that State unless they make a special declaration, Art 
11(2). For an offender who is a national of a State that is not a party to the Statute to come within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC the alleged crimes must have been committed on the territory of a State-party, or on 
the territory of a State that is willing to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to that offence, or the 
crime in question is referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter, Art 12(2)(a). There are therefore practical limitations on the jurisdiction of 
current international courts. 
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The ICJ's decision is not a satisfactory decision from a principled perspective. Many serious 
international crimes have jus cogens status; they are peremptory norms of international law that 
States cannot derogate from.169 In the Pinochet case, Lord Brown-Wilkinson was of the opinion that 
breaches of jus cogens rules may be punished by any State because the offenders are the common 
enemy of all mankind.170 As Judge Al-Khasawneh noted in his dissenting judgment in DRC v 
Belgium where two norms of international law come into conflict, if one of them is of a jus cogens 
character then that norm should prevail. He argues that this is not the effect of the majority 
judgment, where the non-peremptory norm of sovereign immunity for a Foreign Minister effectively 
trumps the jus cogens norm of criminal responsibility for serious international crimes.171 The 
practical impunity the ICJ decision represents for high State officials may undermine these jus 
cogens norms, and the principles behind the decision should be questioned on that basis. 
VII CONCLUSIONS: CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW?  
The issues raised in this paper are extremely topical as there are a number of conflicts currently 
being fought across the globe. Some, such as that in DRC, are being fought with the savagery and 
disregard for international humanitarian law that characterised so many of the conflicts of the last 
century.172 Others are being represented by the western combatants (principally the United States 
and United Kingdom) as being waged scrupulously within the boundaries of international 
humanitarian law, a characteristic of the Kosovo campaign in 1999 and the "war on terror" that so 
far been waged in Afghanistan. However, as noted in this paper there were numerous allegations of 
  
169  Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (14 
February 2002) ICJ <http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobe/judgment/icobe_judgment_20020214.pdf) (last accessed 20 
September 2002), para 7 where Judge Al-Khasawneh, in his dissent, states this principle is of a jus cogens 
character. [DRC v Belgium Al-Khasawneh Dissent]; The concept of jus cogens is included in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 1155 UNTS 331 Art 53, 64.  
170  Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996 Art 18 [ILC Draft Code] 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm> (last accessed 1 April 2001). The Draft Code was 
provisionally adopted in 1988: Regina v Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and 
Others, Ex Parte Pinochet; Regina v Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 
and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet [1999] UKHL 17, (HL) Lord Brown-Wilkinson, paras 40 – 41. 
171 Joint (separate) opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (14 February 2002) ICJ para 80 
[DRC v Belgium Joint Separate Opinion] <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/ 
icobe_ijudgment_20020214_higgins-kooijmans-buergenthal.PDF> (last accessed 20 September 2002), para 
85; DRC v Belgium Al-Khasawneh Dissent, above, para 6; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert 
in DRC v Belgium, para 36 [DRC v Belgium Van Den Wyngaert dissent] <http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214_vdwyngaert.PDF> (last accessed 22 
September 2002) para 7. 
172  For example see the Human Rights Watch Report on the massacres in Kisangani 
<http://hrw.org/reports/2002/drc2/> (last accessed 22 September 2002). 
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war crimes from Kosovo, and there have been serious allegations relating to the war in Afghanistan, 
such as the allegations relating to death of hundreds of Taleban and Al-Qaeda prisoners by 
suffocation.173  
Regardless of the justice of their cause, or lack of it, all combatants must abide by international 
humanitarian law. Commanders have a responsibility to prevent their soldiers from committing war 
crimes, or other serious international crimes, and to punish them if crimes are committed. If 
commanders do not do their duty in this regard they may be criminally liable for the acts of their 
subordinates. Civilian leaders including Heads of Government and Heads of State can be subject to 
this duty, and the consequent liability for failure to perform it. It is incumbent upon the leaders of 
States and military forces, such as President Bush and Prime Minister Blair with the "war on terror", 
to ensure that their military action is lawful. If they fail to take reasonable measures to fulfil this 
duty then they undermine the legal and moral authority of their struggle, and they should be 
prosecuted for their failure to meet the duties imposed on them by international law.  
In the context of the Kosovo operation and the incidents discussed in this paper, it is unlikely 
that either Bill Clinton or Tony Blair would be liable for the offences. It is possible, applying the 
international law tests, for them to be liable under the doctrine of command responsibility for any 
failure to prevent or to punish international crimes committed by their forces. However, in the first 
instance there is insufficient evidence to support a prosecution, as the OTP concluded,174 and 
without the cooperation of the United States and the United Kingdom military it is unlikely that any 
further evidence could be gathered. There is also the likely prospect that NATO and their respective 
armed forces have conducted investigations into the incidents. If these were conducted with due 
diligence and concluded that no offences had occurred they would be probably be sufficient to 
negate the mens rea required for command responsibility and to constitute necessary and reasonable 
measures.  
Even if liability was established, there is the obstacle of sovereign immunity to overcome. Bill 
Clinton, as an ex-Head of State, would only be protected by immunity ratione materiae, giving him 
immunity only for official acts performed whilst in office. Following the reasoning in Pinochet acts 
that give rise to individual criminal responsibility cannot be characterised as official acts, and his 
immunity could not shield him from prosecution at a domestic or international level.175 If 
  
173  UN News Centre "Afghanistan: United Nations Issues Details of Visit to Alleged Mass Grave Site" 20 
August 2002 <http://www0.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=4510&Cr=afghanistan&Cr1=> (last 
accessed 22 September 2002). 
174  Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para 90. 
175  Under the third exception noted in para 61 of the ICJ judgment in Joint Separate opinion of Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (14 February 2002) ICJ para 80 [DRC v Belgium Joint Separate Opinion] 
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international law is characterised by the reasoning of the ICJ, Tony Blair's status as a current Head 
of Government would effectively give him complete immunity from prosecution unless the United 
Kingdom waived his immunity or prosecuted him itself. His immunity ratione personae prevents 
domestic courts from extending their jurisdiction to him, even when that jurisdiction is founded in 
an international convention.176 Practically this prevents this assumption of jurisdiction to arrest and 
extradite him to an International Court that had the necessary jurisdiction to overcome his immunity 
and to try him.177 The result is a virtual impunity for Blair. 
The limitations on jurisdiction of current international courts, combined with the reasoning of 
the ICJ in the DRC v Belgium case undermine the principle of individual criminal responsibility. 
Those guilty of crimes of a jus cogens nature are shielded by an immunity that for all practical 
purposes equals impunity. This paper submits that this is not a satisfactory interpretation of 
international law, and if this in fact a correct interpretation it needs to be challenged by States to 
effect a change to the international customary law. Domestic courts can be an appropriate forum, 
and in some cases may be the only forum to answer breaches of jus cogens norms that by definition 
are of fundamental concern to all States. 
 
 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214_higgins-
kooijmans-buergenthal.PDF> (last accessed 20 September 2002).  
176  DRC v Belgium, above, para 59. 
177  With the possible exception of the ICTY, which would have jurisdiction with respect to these offences, as 
that tribunal is founded by a Chapter VII resolution of the United Nations Security Council, Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as amended 30 November 2000 by Resolution 
1329 [ICTY Statute] <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000_con.htm> (last accessed 16 August 
2001). 
